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Abstract 
 
In Turkey, after 2002  general elections the “Justice and Development Party” has come to the government by itself. 
Demilitarization of  the political system of  Turkey was gradually compleded and a new, civilian, participatory constitution is 
required. Discussions  on a required new constutition has been accompanied by the strengthening the executive branch. In 
crisis situations, instead of strengthening the democratic partipatory institutions, it is always preferable to reorganize the 
political institutions in favor of the executive branch. In this context presitential system or semi-presidential system have been 
seen as a new model of govenment and guaranty of the stability of govenment instead of the existing semi-parliamentary / or / 
semi-semi-presidential political system. The media as an ideological aparatus of the state has been acted its role on the 
discussion programmes. The academicians, intellectuals and journalists as organic intellectuals  have been discussing on 
“which political system is good for our democracy?” In this paper, it is aimed to analize the TV  discussion programmes on a 
new  political system. Metedologically three TV  news channels and their discussion programmes will be chosen throughout  
four weeks. It is intended to analize the program contents on democratic discurses.   
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Turkey, in the 1980’s, the national development policies and the  import substitution policies  came to an end and the 
national economy has been articulating the global economic system by using “stabilization programmes” and “structural 
adjustment programmes”.  
The 1990s was a long decade of  political instability which determined the political agenda with  coalition 
governments and constant  indirect interventions by  the Turkish army that have been called Praetorianism. After the 
2002  general elections, the “Justice and Development Party” won a majority in parliement. During its time in power, AKP  
(Justice and Development Party) has succeeded in reducing the functions of the army with in the political system, 
changing many Articles of the Constitution  and some laws. Decreasing the direct or indirect interventions of the armed 
forces primarily at a legal level (by changing the laws), AKP intended  to change the 1982 Constitution, made by the 
military regime. An expectation of a more liberal, participatory, pluralistic constitution relying on a consensus of different 
social groups has appeared in Turkish society. Besides democratic expectations, discussions of political system 
specificially the  “presidential system” have entered the political arena. 
Methodologically, an instutional approach has been used with Poulantzas’s “authoritarian statism” 
conceptualization.  Three news channels and their  three TV discussion programmes were chosen for study over a four 
month period. Media, as the ideologically most important and impressive aparatus of the state, made programmes to 
gain the consent of a large part of  society. It is intended to analyse the discourses of the debates in the discussion 
programmes. 
 
2. “Authoritarian Statism" 
 
Poulantzas’s conceptualization  “authoritarian statism” helps  us to understand the discussion of political system at the 
same time as the instutional approach. In his book State, Power, Socialism he stated that a new form of state appeared.( 
was going to appear). This means, the institutions of political democracy and formal liberities will be gradually  weakened 
and state control will be intensified throughout  social and economic life. Authoritarian Statism, represents the new 
“democratic” form of bourgeois republic in the actual phase (Poulantzas, 2004: 234). 
Following Poulantzas, Bob Jessop defined the characteristics of Authoriterian Statism as, the political power 
delegated to the executive branch from the legislative branch and the personalization of power intensifies in the prime 
minister or (here) president. Legislative, executive and juridical powers tend to become integrated. The State of Law 
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weakens in favour of  Personalization. Giving up their traditional roles, political parties take on transmission roles for the 
executive branch. Media becomes  an ideological aparatus of the state creating the  political legitimacy and the  power of 
control of the media gradually expands. At the same time as some forms of neoliberal legitimacy, a plebiscitary and 
populist technology of consent spreads out (Jessop, 2005: 100-101). 
 
3. Neoliberal Economic Policies and the Crisis or A Brief History of Presidential System Discussions  
 
The history of political system discussions goes back to the 1980’s when Turgut Özal’s “Motherland Party” (ANAP) was  
in power during his prime ministery and presidential term. In economic crisis situations it is always preferable to change  
political institutions in favour of the executive branch. The center right had come together under the flag of ANAP and 
Özal’s desire for  a very powerful executive determined the discussions on political system at that time. But ANAP had 
appeared to be a Leader Party,  it’s life depended on it’s leader’s life. After Turgut Özal’s unexpected sudden death  the 
political system discussions were suspended. 
Articulating with  the world system by way of  structural adjustment and stabilization programmes,  the Turkish 
economy entered in neoliberal process after the 24 January 1980 economic decisions. According to the 1961 
Constitution Turkey’s governmental system was very typically parliamentary, the executive branch  was double - headed, 
president and prime minister and his / her government. Presidental elections  were  indirect in that parliement elects the 
president as the non-responsible head of the executive branch. In 1971 some of the Articles of the Constitution had been 
changed by the intervention of the armed forces in favour of the executive branch of the parliamentary system.  
In the second half of the  1970’s, a structural  crisis of capitalism effected the Turkish economic system, especially 
in 1977. The import substitution development model had come to it’s end. In the sense of a Gramscian hegemonic crisis, 
this economic crisis had turned into political crisis, the political institutions collapsed, the social opposition movements  
arose all over the country. The military coup d’état and its General had presented itself  as a moderator above all of the 
classes, all of the social groups and thus took  political power. At the same time as following the neoliberal economic 
policies, the constitution and almost all the political institutions had been changed radically by the violence of the state.  
The parliamentary system - seen to be responsible for the political crisis  – had been changed in favour of the executive 
branch, and the president’s political authority was expecially enhanced. But political practice  remained parliamentary.  
During the ANAP period,  after Turgut Özal’s  prime ministry, he was indirectly elected as president, by  parliament. 
Following Duverger, the “system’s political practice appeared as presidentialism” (Stepan&Skach, 1994: 134-135) at that 
time. The political system operated, the party in power had a majority in  parliament and the president was from the same 
party. 
Every crisis is indeed  a resettlement process; economic reorganisation processes need political and 
administrational regulation. The “president” (Özal, calling himself  that, recalled the United States president in people’s 
minds) twisted the system with the help of the majority of his party in  parliament. As the politically non-responsible head 
of the executive branch, issuing Decree Laws,  took the authority from the legislative to the presidency.  Because of  the 
falling profit rates of  capital that had  caused the economic crisis, the state was reorganized by delegation of authority 
from the legislative to a strong executive and the decision-making processes were separated. 
After the AKP’s  57.88 % success in the 12 September 2010 referendum, some changes accepted in the existing 
1982 Constitution made by the military regime on 12 September 1980, expectetions of a more participatory, liberal, 
inclusive of human rights and social consensus constitution have risen in responds to  the  demands of individuals and 
many social groups. Discussions on the new constitution have taken place on platforms such as congresses, 
conferences, forums and especially in the media, by  academicians, journalists, politicians and members of many 
pressure groups. The government party’s leader, Erdo÷an, decleared a new constitution had to bring a new government 
system, a presidential system. The new constitution discussions  have turned into  new political system discussions and 
engaged the political agenda, dating from the referendum results.  
Indeed, Turkey’s political tradition has always been parliamentary;  the proportional representation election system 
fosters a multiparty system that represents the different groups  in  society.  One of the most remarkable tradition is the 
political parties’  strongly diciplined attitude in the legislature. The “necessary condition” of the parliamentary system is  
party dicipline, without party dicipline the system turns into inoperative  legislative government (Sartori, 1997:127).  
 
4. AKP Party and Reorganization of  the Political and Administrative Spheres 
 
After the AKP  came to  power in 2002, the party’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdo÷an, has expressed a desire for political 
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system change. In most of his speeches begining from 2003,  he decleared a presidential model like in the United States. 
The AKP is a massive, dominant governmental party. In  the  2011 general election it took 49.83 % of the votes and has 
won 327 seats in  parliament, gradually increasing its votes since 2002 to the last 2011 general election. 
When we look at the history of political system discussions, it is easily seen  that party and its leaders who believe 
in and   so enthusiastically  pursue neoliberal economic policies want to change the system to presidentialism. At the  
institutional level a strong and stable executive to accelerat decision-making processes  is required. Presidentialism 
comprises some difficulties, it operates in the form of winner-take-all; this makes  democratic politics  a zero-sum game 
(Linz, 1992: 123). So the functions of opposition party or parties decrease in the political sphere. During  its years in 
power AKP has provided continous absolute majority in parliament and  has been the dominant party for 11 years. At 
institutional level it hasn’t confronted any problems that could  create political instability. Relying on its majority in  
parliament in the legislation processes for constitutional changes and as a part of global economic policy  made  in 
accordance with these decisions changed the public administration and more importantly changed the juridical system 
profoundly. 
One party with absolute majority in  parliament and with a personalization of power operates like presidentialism. 
Only the leader –the prime minister- speaks (only a few of the other ministers in the government  speak only on their own 
areas) and has a strong control over the government and over his party; that leads to the personalization of power. It 
looks very similar to a presidential system when the prime minister  has the majority of parliament fbehind him as in the 
case of AKP party. 
According to the draft  AKP constitution, the president has the authority to issue executive decrees. The legislative 
delegates its authority to the executive, to the president. Thus the president can decide to send the army abroad 
although this power belongs only to the legislative in every other constitution. 
The most remarkable article of the draft  AKP constitution, is the power of the president to dissolve  parliament. 
This is different from  United States and also different  from Latin American countries presidential systems. The president 
and the members of parliament will be elected at the same time by the electorate.  Division of power as the defining 
feature of presidentialism is refused. Here, a strong leader is wanted for the future of AKP governments, but full 
presidential system as in the United States, is not considered. If the president and the parliamenter majority are from 
different political parties, the president can dissolve  parliament  himself (or herself). So  elections will be a kind of 
plebiscit, and this will be reinforced by the personalization of the president. Whenever the president wants, the 
cicumstances to favour  him (her), parliamentary  elections  will be  repeated in practice. 
Karl Marx in his book “18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” emphasized dual democratic legitimacy: “The elected 
National stands in a metaphysical relation, but the elected President in a personal relation. The Natioal Assembly, 
indeed, exhibits in its individual representatives the manifold aspects of the national spirit, but in the President this 
national spirit finds its incarnation. As against the Assemly, he possesses a sort of divine right; he is President by the 
grace of the people” (1976: 33; and   Linz, 1994: 8). Here, Marx predicted that the sharing of authority between the 
president and the National Assembly would be ended by the 1848 Constitution in France. The Achilles heel of the 
institutional and constitutional structure  collapsed ‘at  touch of the thricorn hat of Napoleon’. 
There is no democratic principle in presidential regimes based on dual democratic legitimacy that can decide who 
represents the will of the people in principle (Linz, 1994: 7). 
 
5. TV Discussion  Programs on Political System: Manifacturing Consent 
 
Three TV news channels, “CNN Türk”, “NTV” and “Habertürk” and their live discussion programmes “Ne Oluyor?”, “Dört 
Bir Taraf”, “Türkiye’nin NabzÕ”  have been chosen. It is aimed to analysis the debaters’ discourse in the context of 
democracy. 
The CNN Türk channel, “Ne Oluyor?” (“What is Happening?”) discussion programme, has a presenter and mostly 
calls academicians, technocrats, ministers. The debaters are invited to discuss    “political systems and constitutions”, the 
chief of “constitution comission” and at the same time member of parliament, on the one side, on the other side the 
professors of constitutional law or political science from the universities. Mostly the presenter intervenes the discussions 
for explanation for audience when discussions go to technical extend. 
On the NTV programme, “Dört Bir Taraf” (“Four Sides”) there is no  presenter. Four journalists -two women and 
two men- discuss the actual issues among themselves, and each of them is moderator in turn. Two of the  journalists are  
close to the government, the others stand in critical opposition. 
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On the Habertürk channel, “Türkiye’nin NabzÕ” (“Turkey’s Pulse”) discussion programme, there is a presenter, The 
program host academicians, technocrats, journalists and political party members. The programme has a  phone 
connection to the  hosts from other cities outside of Istanbul. 
The debaters talk about; division of  power, the president’s authority over the legistlative branch and juridical 
independence, on the necessity of political system change. Relations between different political systems and economic 
develoment and strong democracy. 
1) All of the debaters agree that the Turkish model of presidential system has unique characteristics, dissimilar to 
the other country’s models such as the United States and Latin American Countries. This is called the “Turkish 
presidential system” (“a la turca system”). 
2) The members of govenment (members of parliament or ministers) and the journalists close to the government, 
emphasize the “stability of government”, the “economic development”, the “continuity of administrative and 
economic reforms”; the debaters who criticize the presidential system for Turkey, the parliamentary system 
has to  continue for sake of democracy’s stabilization. 
3) The presidential system provides   political stability as against coalition governments comprised of many  
parties.  The other debators insist that  elections and the  political party system provide the political stability, it 
doesn’t need to change the governmental system. But it needs to change the law on political parties and 
improve their internal democracy as against the  party leaders’ hegemony. 
4) The divion of powers, checks and balances, have disappeared in favour of a president, a very powerful 
president required to provide political stability is demanded by the debaters on the government side. The 
opposition debaters insist on with this kind of president the regime will turn   on an authoriterian way in 
contrast to the claims about president’s authority will  decrease. 
5) One side of the debate, connects  the presidential system  to the “rate of economic development”, the orhers  
stress the importance of  subjects like “human development index”, “women’s condition and development” 
“political development” or “strong democracy”. 
6) The debators on the government side insist on reducing the party system to a two party system. The others 
are various other agendas. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
AKP party has been in political power since 2002. In this very powerful period the party leader and his staffs have 
suggested that the  political system should change from parliamentarianism to presidentialism. In Turkey, all of the  
political parties generally agree on  neoliberal economic policies. The neoliberal hegemony has  lasted. With  a strong 
executive, the actual and probable crisises have been overcome. Presidential government leads to the personalization of 
power. The President’s strong claim to democratic, even plebiscitarian, legitimacy is a danger to democracy when he 
(she) manipulates public emotions to strengthen his (her) power or popularity.  Legislative, executive and juridical powers 
will become integrated. As a result of the personalization the state, the state  of law weakens. 
Turkey’s tradition is a parliamentary system. Even using the techniques of social engineering the political parties 
well diciplined structure can not be changed, this  is also a deeply rooted tradition.  
The question is “why does the AKP party, especially its leader, have such a strong desire for a “Turkish kind of 
presidentialism” The answer  has to be not only (full) economic, but  at the same time cultural. They want to perform a 
kind of social engineering to make changes,  reforms to social life in such areas as education, the family and the women 
and envorimental policies.  
Television programmes about political systems, are part of the ideological aparatus of the state for manifacturing 
consent. Mostly the discussions turn around the complicated and technical subjects especially on law that the ordinary 
audience could find difficult to understand. Some of the debaters speeches manipulate  national feelings about the 
President’s personalization essence using the ideas of  “powerful executive” with “powerful president” and in its turn 
“powerful state”. Democracy doesn’t  need the  touch of any kind or any colour of  hat instead of participatory and 
promoting freedom. 
Instead of  asking which political system provides the most the stable government, it is beter to ask  which political 
system provides more participatory democracy. 
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